interpreted by the police as acquiescence to questioning, and suspects who remain silent in the belief that they are triggering their rights do so at their own peril. 6 Any statement a suspect makes-even a one-word remark after three hours of silenceprobably constitutes a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 7 In practice, then, a simple response to a police question after hours of fruitless inquiry may be sufficient to impose a life sentence upon the accused. 8 This is, indeed, the state of the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
The ease with which modern courts find valid waivers of the Fifth Amendment privilege reflects decades of post-Miranda Supreme Court decisions that have diminished the government's burden in proving waiver. 9 In particular, the creation of the implied waiver doctrine now permits courts to infer that a defendant waives the right to silence by engaging in a "course of conduct indicating waiver." 10 Since the inception of this principle, the Supreme Court's Miranda jurisprudence has made invocation of the right to silence so difficult and waiver so easy that the burden has been effectively placed on the defendant to prove invocation rather than on the prosecution to prove waiver. 11 For example, interrogators can simply begin questioning without asking suspects whether they 6 See Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (noting that there is "good reason" to require the accused to invoke the right to silence in an unambiguous manner). The Court's Berghuis opinion reaffirmed numerous lower court decisions requiring suspects to affirmatively invoke the right to silence. See, e.g., James v. Marshall, 322 F.3d 103, 108-09 (1st Cir. 2003) (analyzing whether the defendant invoked his right to silence unambiguously); Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1131 (8th Cir. 2001) (asking whether defendant made unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent). 7 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (concluding that the defendant's one-word response to police after three hours of unsuccessful interrogation constituted a "course of conduct indicating waiver") (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) wish to assert their rights; if suspects respond to questioning by saying nothing, they are presumed to have made an implied waiver.
12
This note explores the origins and purposes of the implied waiver doctrine and proposes a contemporary rule that attempts to strike the proper balance between society's interest in obtaining valid confessions and a defendant's interest in securing his constitutional rights. This analysis is divided into three parts. Part I addresses the framework established by the Court's Miranda decision and postMiranda trends relating to custodial interrogation and waiver. Part II traces the growth and development of the implied waiver doctrine, with a particular emphasis on the types of conduct that courts have found to constitute waiver. Finally, Part III argues that the underlying purposes of Miranda can only be fulfilled by limiting the implied waiver doctrine. Specifically, implied waivers should be limited to circumstances in which defendants do not explicitly waive their rights but engage in conversation with interrogating officers immediately after the Miranda warnings are given.
I. THE PURPOSE AND CONSEQUENCES OF MIRANDA
The expressed purpose of Miranda is to provide law enforcement with concrete procedural guidelines to preserve the accused's constitutional rights and to relieve persons taken into custody of the inherent coercive pressures of police interrogations. 13 To this end, police must inform suspects prior to questioning that
(1) they have the right to remain silent; (2) their statements may be used against them at trial; (3) they have the right to an attorney; (4) they have the right to an appointed attorney if they cannot otherwise afford counsel.
14
The Court chose to adopt this prophylactic rule in response to the perceived dangers of contemporaneous interrogation practices. 15 coercion can be both mental and physical, and that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." 18 The process of interrogation is itself intricately designed to induce stress and anxiety, leading suspects to believe that the apparent hopelessness of the situation will only be alleviated by making a statement.
19
The Miranda Court determined that protecting the accused from the pressures of custodial interrogation required not only that a suspect be advised of his rights, but also that the prosecution overcome a heavy burden in proving that the accused waived his rights. 20 Specifically, the government must show that an accused's waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 21 Moreover, the Court held that the accused can invoke the right to silence in any manner, at any time.
22
The government, then, faces a demanding burden in proving that the accused has made a valid waiver. 23 In part, this heavy burden stems from the significant latitude given to the accused to invoke the Miranda protections at any time and in any manner. 24 The Court's instructions regarding the suspect's invocation of rights were unusually explicit. By allowing suspects to assert their rights in any manner, the Court did not place any burden on the accused to demonstrate, for example, that invocation was unequivocal or unambiguous.
25
Given this basic framework, it was reasonable to assume that more criminal suspects would take advantage of Miranda after the Court's ruling in 1966. Suspects would now have the benefit of being appraised of their rights upon arrest while also being provided with the opportunity to remain silent and secure counsel. Indeed, the dissent predicted that "a good many criminal defendants who otherwise would have been convicted . . . will now either not be tried at all or will be acquitted . . . ." 26 In the days and months after the ruling was announced, critics 18 Id. at 448 (quoting Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 206 (1960) These well-documented police practices-designed for the purpose of bypassing the requirements of Miranda-are important for several reasons. First, by prolonging interrogations after the accused has signaled a desire to exercise his Miranda rights, law enforcement officials explicitly violate the Miranda Court's "clear" procedural requirement that the interrogation cease when the accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent. 40 Furthermore, a defendant who unsuccessfully attempts to invoke his Miranda rights is likely to believe that any further invocation is futile because the police will persist in their effort to extract a confession, notwithstanding the accused's expressed intent to end the interrogation. 41 Finally, the continuation of questioning provides the police with more opportunities to obtain a confession, which, of course, has serious implications for the accused. In short, Miranda has not left law enforcement shackled and hopeless; far from the perceived world of the guilty-gone-free, Miranda has not significantly curtailed police efforts at obtaining confessions and securing convictions.
The second explanation for post-Miranda trends in favor of valid waivers and successful interrogations is the proliferation of court decisions making it more 35 Id. at 435. See also DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 201 (1991). 36 Leo & White, supra note 27, at 440. 37 Id. difficult for suspects to exercise their Miranda rights. 42 The waiver regime envisioned by Miranda's drafters favored the accused by placing a heavy burden on the government to prove a knowing and voluntary waiver. 43 In effect, the prosecution would face the same standard handed down by the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, a case concerning the right to counsel: whether the accused intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known right or privilege. 44 This test presumes that the accused is aware of the consequences of forgoing his rights, for it stands to reason that a person cannot intentionally relinquish a known right without comprehending the consequences of that right's exercise or abandonment. 45 The Miranda Court, then, established a waiver test that requires a suspect to both understand the substance of the right to silence and right to counsel and the consequences of relinquishing those rights.
46
In the years following Miranda, however, this rigid waiver system was gradually diluted by decisions easing the government's burden to prove waiver. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that the government only needs to demonstrate that a suspect understood the meaning of the rights to silence and counsel, not the consequences of abandoning them; furthermore, a suspect can knowingly and voluntarily waive the Miranda privileges without being informed that a lawyer has been appointed to represent him. 47 Police tactics aimed at inducing waivers have withstood Miranda's prohibition against trickery or cajolery through application of a "totality of the circumstances test" to evaluate the voluntariness of waivers. 48 This approach to voluntariness suggests that the use of certain prohibited police practices will not alone render a waiver invalid. Rather, in applying the totality framework, the court will weigh several factors: the characteristics of the suspect, the context of the interrogation, and the overall conduct of the interrogators. 49 Moreover, the use of "softening up" tactics and strategies designed to overcome a suspect's resistance to questioning suggests that courts have granted interrogators significant leeway during questioning. In this regard, lower courts have been especially permissive; no court has held that police are prohibited from using persuasive techniques to induce waivers.
50
The creation of the implied waiver doctrine, however, was perhaps the most important post-Miranda event-the catalyst for the dissolution of the Miranda waiver regime. 51 Once the Supreme Court ruled that a suspect may forgo his rights through any conduct evidencing waiver, the stage was set for a renewed assessment of Miranda's foundations.
II. IMPLIED WAIVER DOCTRINE: ORIGINS AND FALLOUT
There is reason to believe that at the time Miranda became law, interrogators were prohibited from questioning suspects in the absence of a valid waiver.
52 By its own terms, Miranda requires law enforcement officials to cease questioning when the accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent. 53 Questioning must also end when a suspect requests the assistance of counsel. 54 Not only does the presumption favor the accused, but the Miranda court repeatedly emphasized that the pressures inherent in custodial interrogation could only be dispelled if the accused has "a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination" by being informed of his rights and having the exercise of those rights honored.
55
Several decisions following Miranda, however, made it clear that police are free to continue questioning, even if a suspect invokes the right to silence or asks for an attorney. For instance, in Michigan v. Mosley, the Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of an incriminating statement rendered during a second interrogation two hours after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent. 56 second line of questioning began after a significant period of time and involved a different crime, the Court concluded that the defendant's rights were "scrupulously honored," and thus, his inculpatory remarks relating to the first crime (made during the second interrogation) were admissible.
57
In practice, the "scrupulously honored" test does not vary significantly from the original Miranda requirement of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.
58
In any event, Mosley does exemplify the principle that police may persist in questioning even in the absence of a formal waiver or after the accused properly invokes Miranda. This point should not be understated. At the beginning of questioning, a suspect exists in a kind of no-man's land: he has neither exercised nor surrendered his rights. This leaves the police with significant power to manipulate the situation in a way that makes successful questioning more likely. The creation of the implied waiver doctrine only magnifies this reality because, by acknowledging that suspects may waive their rights through a "course of conduct indicating waiver," the Court broadened the scope of conduct that constitutes waiver.
59
Implied waivers find their origin in North Carolina v. Butler. 60 In Butler, the Court upheld the validity of a confession volunteered by the defendant after he orally acknowledged that he understood his rights, and did not explicitly waive them, but agreed to cooperate with the interrogating officers. 61 The defendant refused to sign an "Advice of Rights" form but later remarked that he would talk with FBI Agents. 62 The Court interpreted Miranda to mean that express or oral statements of waiver, while "strong proof" of the validity of waiver, are not essential to a finding of waiver; rather any "course of conduct indicating waiver" is sufficient to establish that the accused has surrendered his rights. 63 Lower courts have been quick to seize on Butler's ultimate holding. Since the 1979 decision, every federal court of appeals has upheld the admissibility of 57 
Id.
58 Leo & White, supra note 27, at 425. 59 The defendant in Thompkins, for example, made a one-word "yes" response to a question directed at him three hours after interrogation began. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2010). 60 441 U.S. 369 (1979). 61 Id. at 371. 62 Id. 63 Id. at 373.
statements falling under the category of implied waiver. 64 But Butler is not the natural or inevitable consequence of Miranda. In particular, the Court's opinion in Miranda took pains to reaffirm that waiver could never be presumed from the silence of the accused or from the fact that the accused eventually makes a confession. 65 Distinguishing between situations in which the accused has engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver before confessing and situations in which the accused has not engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver before confessing is an unenviable task: it is a fact-sensitive inquiry, and no circumstance is singularly dispositive.
In attempting to provide guidance on what constitutes a valid waiver of a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights, courts have turned to the initial question of what constitutes invocation of those same rights. 66 The relationship between invocation and waiver proves to be vital because once a suspect insufficiently invokes his rights, any subsequent statement might constitute an implied waiver. 67 67 See id. at 462 (explaining that the defendant did not properly invoke his right to counsel where he made only an ambiguous statement and that in the absence of a valid invocation, the defendant's actions and words indicated his intent to waive his rights). 68 Id.
69 Id. at 455. 70 Id.
counsel present. 71 The agents continued questioning until Davis asked, unequivocally, for the assistance of an attorney. 72 The Court rejected Davis' argument that the agents were required to cease questioning after the first, ambiguous request for counsel; to the contrary, the Court held that a proper invocation of the right to counsel requires a suspect to make an "unambiguous or unequivocal" request.
73
As an initial matter, the Davis decision contradicts the Miranda Court's holding that suspects may invoke their rights in any manner and at any time. 74 The
Davis decision also places on suspects the burden of exercising their rights in a fashion that is not immediately apparent from the Miranda warnings. The warnings themselves merely advise suspects that they have the right to the assistance of counsel; 75 there is no corollary instruction regarding the limited means by which the accused can exercise this right.
Even after the Davis opinion, there was reason to believe that Miranda would remain largely intact. By its own terms, Davis appears to govern only those cases in which suspects first waive their rights before attempting to invoke them. 76 The
Court in Davis confronted a situation in which a suspect effectively waived his Miranda rights, cooperated with police for ninety minutes, made an ambiguous request for an attorney, but then continued to talk with the police in the absence of counsel. 77 The Court held that "[a]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney." 78 In effect, the Court limited its decision to scenarios in which the suspect consents to questioning before reconsidering the prudence of cooperating in the absence of a lawyer. At this stage in the questioning, the accused has acknowledged his understanding of the right to remain silent and the right to 71 Id. 75 Id. at 444. 76 Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 ("We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney."). 77 Id. at 455. 78 Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
counsel, thereby alleviating the initial pressures inherent in custodial interrogation. 79 Davis, moreover, concerned the right to counsel, not the right to remain silent. 80 This distinction is critical because, unlike the right to remain silent, the right to counsel can only be invoked by an affirmative act; that is, a suspect must break silence to assert the right. 81 By articulating the requirements for assertion, the Court was, in its own words, attempting to provide law enforcement with clear procedural guidelines in the conduct of custodial interrogation. 82 Such a clear standard for assertion is not necessary for the right to remain silent, which implies that suspects may exercise silence by simply not speaking. 83 Put another way, the natural meaning of "remaining silent" is to continue in a state of abstaining from speech. 84 Nevertheless, this seemingly self-evident proposition failed to find recognition in the lower courts grappling with the Davis decision.
By 2008, at least seven federal circuit courts extended Davis' "unambiguous statement" standard to the initial waiver stage. 85 Some circuits also applied Davis to the initial question of whether a suspect properly invoked the right to remain silent. 86 1996) (assuming arguendo that a "parallel standard" to Davis applies to the right to remain silent).
precision of an "Oxford don," 87 lower courts have struggled to distinguish between the ambiguous and the unequivocal.
88
The uncertainty brewing in the lower courts concerning the interrelationship of invocation and waiver and the proper application of Davis reached a boiling point in Berghuis v. Thompkins . 89 The defendant in Berghuis was arrested in connection with a murder that occurred in Southfield, Michigan. 90 During questioning, the suspect signed an advice-of-rights form, but remained generally uncommunicative 91 and, in the officer's words, "largely silent." 92 After three hours of unsuccessful questioning, the interrogating officer made one final attempt to elicit a response by asking a series of questions concerning the suspect's religious beliefs, culminating in, "Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?" 93 The suspect's "yes" response was offered as evidence at his trial, which resulted in a conviction.
94
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the Davis "unambiguous request" standard applies to the right to remain silent (that is, the suspect must unambiguously request to remain silent) and that Thompkins' "yes" response to the officer's question constituted a course of conduct indicating waiver. 95 Berghuis clearly exemplifies the suspect's dilemma: even if Thompkins believed that he was exercising his right to silence by remaining silent for the first three hours of interrogation, his one-word response to the officer's question amounted to a waiver, which ultimately resulted in his conviction. Berghuis shows that an insufficient invocation often yields a valid waiver. As the dissent in Berghuis noted, the plain language of Miranda contradicts the Berghuis majority's holding. 96 First, the Court in Miranda observed:
The fact of lengthy interrogation . . . before a statement is taken is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.
97
Furthermore, waiver may not be presumed simply from the fact that the police obtain a confession. 98 Finally, "mere silence" in response to questioning is insufficient to establish waiver because a suspect's silence does not provide adequate assurances that he has "intelligently and understandingly" rejected the offer to exercise his rights. 99 But the most glaring contradiction is the majority's conclusion that Thompkins' incriminating statement-his "yes" responseamounted to a "course of conduct indicating waiver," despite Miranda's warning that inculpatory statements alone are insufficient to establish waiver. 100 A finding that Thompkins had not in fact waived his rights would have precluded the necessity of analyzing whether he invoked his right to silence, relieving the Court of the difficult question regarding Davis' applicability.
101
The Berghuis Court's novel application of the implied waiver doctrine leaves criminal suspects in a tough position: as long as they understand the substance of the Miranda warning, any uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver, even if the only statement a suspect makes is an inculpatory one. 102 In effect, the Court has endorsed a jurisprudence of confession-as-waiver. 96 Id. at 2268 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
97 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) . 98 Id. at 475. 99 Id. 100 Id. See also Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 101 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2273 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 102 Id. at 2262 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
III. MOVING FORWARD AFTER BERGHUIS: LIMITING IMPLIED WAIVERS AND CLARIFYING THE MIRANDA WARNING
To ensure that the constitutional rights of criminal suspects remain as strongly protected today as they were in the immediate aftermath of Miranda, the postBerghuis implied waiver doctrine should be limited in scope, and suspects should be advised of the proper method of invoking their rights.
Under the original Miranda framework, waiver was only effective if "specifically made" by the accused. 103 The exception recognized in Butler for waivers implied from the totality of the circumstances is narrow in scope to ensure that the original principles of Miranda continue to protect criminal suspects.
104
Butler addresses the particular situation in which the accused who refuses to formally waive his rights nevertheless cooperates with the interrogators immediately after questioning begins, signaling a willingness to comply with the officer's request for a statement. 105 It is from the accused's affirmative compliance from the onset of interrogation that waiver is inferred. Thus, despite recognizing a narrow exception to the Miranda rule, the Butler Court reaffirmed Miranda's original observation that "the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights."
106
In short, faithful application of Miranda is best achieved by applying the implied waiver exception only to those cases in which the accused cooperates from the beginning of questioning. This "initial compliance" reading of Butler vindicates Miranda's conclusion that the police-dominated interrogation setting works very quickly to compel the accused to speak. 107 As discussed earlier, police have become especially proficient at employing techniques of persuasion, which are intended to undermine the defendant's will. requiring the government to demonstrate that the accused has manifested some consent to participating in questioning, the initial compliance standard ensures that any incriminating statement is the product of the accused's free will, which is the hallmark of the Miranda waiver system.
117
In addition to confining the application of the implied waiver doctrine, suspects taken into custody should be advised that if they wish to exercise their right to remain silent, they must make an "unambiguous request"
118 to do so. This addition to the standard Miranda warning incorporates the Court's determination in Berghuis that the Davis unambiguous-request standard applies to the right to remain silent, even though Davis-on its face-only governs post-waiver invocations of the right to counsel.
119
There are two primary reasons to incorporate the "unambiguous" language into the familiar Miranda warnings. First, it ensures that criminal suspects are aware of the proper method for exercising their constitutional rights, in the same way that the standard Miranda warnings ensure that suspects are aware of their rights. 120 Second, because there is great uncertainty in the lower courts about what constitutes an unambiguous statement or assertion, 121 it is essential that the accused is advised of the need to be explicit, particular, and definite. Statements containing modifiers or hedges are especially likely to be insufficient under Davis. 122 Indeed, as previously noted, when a suspect makes an ambiguous request that he believes to be an assertion of his rights, the interrogator's refusal to end questioning may lead the suspect to believe that further objection is pointless. 123 Interestingly, the Davis Court, which held that defendants must assert the right to counsel in an unambiguous manner, nevertheless acknowledged:
When a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored (and by hypothesis, he has said something that an objective listener could "reasonably," although not necessarily, take to be a request), in contravention of the "rights" just read to him by his interrogator, he may well see further objection as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation. 124 In assessing how the extension of Davis may affect invocation of the right to remain silent, Professor Marcy Strauss has identified eights types of statements often interpreted by the courts as ambiguous despite a suspect's intent to invoke the right:
order to remain silent, 128 an enhanced Miranda warning guards against the possibility that a suspect will unwillingly waive his rights after trying futilely to assert them.
129

IV. CONCLUSION
If the purpose of Miranda is to provide law enforcement with clear procedural guidelines in the conduct of custodial interrogation, while alleviating suspects of the inherent pressures of police questioning, 130 then it must be considered why, after forty-five years, the procedural guidelines are not quite clear at all and the inherent pressures of police questioning have been replaced by new pressures on suspects to invoke their rights in a narrowly-circumscribed manner. How far can police go in extracting confessions? If three hours of persistent questioning is constitutionally permissible, 131 is six or eight or eighteen hours? Which statements of invocation by a suspect are sufficiently unambiguous? Can police continue questioning even when suspects make unequivocal requests to exercise their rights?
Perhaps the most provocative question after Berghuis is this: absent an unequivocal assertion of the right to silence, is there anything a suspect can say or do that does not amount to a course of conduct indicating waiver? If an incriminating, one-word response after three hours of silence signals a suspect's willingness to surrender the right, what words or actions by the accused will not amount to an implied waiver?
These are the questions that the lower courts now face. In the meantime, thousands of interrogations will now be governed by a new set of rules that leave suspects uninformed about the proper method of exercising their rights, while providing law enforcement with incentives to persist in questioning in the hope that any slight response from the accused will be deemed an implied waiver. The consequences could not be more real or severe: Berghuis now sits in a jail cell for the remainder of his life, in large part because he once said "yes." If the right to remain silent does not actually permit one to remain silent, then we all have a right to know about it.
